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The Psychology of Mediation: Issues
of Self and Identity and the IDR Cycle
Elizabeth E. Bader*

INTRODUCTION

Issues of self-identity and self-esteem play an important role in

negotiation and mediation. Sometimes they are spoken of in terms of a
party's need to "save face" or of a person's "ego" clouding his thinking. 1
They may also be referred to as "narcissistic issues," a term that no longer
necessarily connotes pathology.2 Put simply, most people take the conflict
personally and the outcome of the mediation as a reflection of who they are.
Issues of self and identity raise profound and often painful questions
about who we are. Psychoanalytic developmental theory considers these
questions by analyzing the way the sense of self develops in childhood.' On
the other hand, many spiritual traditions insist that however it develops, the

° Bader Conflict Resolution Services, 580 California Street, Suite 500, San Francisco,
California
94104. Tel.: (415) 391-7272; email: elizabeth@elizabethbader.com. This article is dedicated to
Jesse L. Judnick in appreciation of our friendship. The author also wishes to thank the following
people for their comments on previous drafts of this article: Jeanne Fahey, Herbert Fingarette, Judy
Gordon, Jesse L Judnick, Faisal Muqaddam, George Saiger, William Singletary, Leslie Wellbaum,
and Maggie Zellner.
1. See, e.g., Judith B. White et al., Face Threat Sensitivity in Negotiation: Roadblock to
Agreement, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102 (2004) (discussing
face saving in negotiation); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, PsychologicalPrinciples in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 15-19 (1999) (discussing parties' frequent
"egocentric" biases and positive illusions).
2. The term "narcissism" originally had an autoerotic, and therefore a pejorative, connotation.
See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, On Narcissism: An Introduction, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey et al. trans., 1966),

reprinted in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON NARCISSISM 17 (Andrew P. Morrison ed., 1986) [hereinafter
ESSENTIAL PAPERS]. This is no longer the case. See Leonard Horwitz, Narcissistic Leadership in
Psychotherapy Groups, 50 INT'L. J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 219-20 (2000) (explaining that,
contrary to older views, narcissism is now considered to be "shared by all humans" and as "vital...
as the physiological functions of temperature, respiration, and heartbeat.").
3. See infra Part I.
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ego, our usual sense of who we are, is actually an illusion, and a limitation.
In recent years, there have been some important attempts to bridge the gap
between these two positions. 5 Yet, the nature of the self and its identity still
remains a fundamental mystery.
This article considers the self from these perspectives, and others,
including neuroscience6 and social psychology, within the context of
mediation. On a psychological level, parties in mediation typically move
through a cycle of narcissistic inflation, deflation, and then, hopefully,
realistic resolution. I call this the IDR cycle.8 This process demands
strength of self on a basic, simple, healthy ego level, especially at the outset.
Parties strive to be equal to the task.
However, during impasse and other "critical moments," 9 if the parties
wish to reach resolution, they may have to release their psychological
investments in the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, the capacity to let go is
also a critical aspect of the psychology of mediation.
The mediator's own issues of self and identity will also arise during
mediation. During critical moments, the mediator, too, may have to release
the sense of narcissistic self-investment in the outcome. Thus, our
usefulness as mediators will often depend on the extent to which we have
learned to deal with issues of self and identity, not only in others, but in
ourselves.
I.

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF
SELF AND IDENTITY

It is well established that issues of self and identity play an important
role in negotiation and mediation.' 1 "Whether anticipated or enacted,

4. See infra Parts II.A, B.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra notes 15, 95-107, 146-147, 167 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Critical moments are turning points in negotiations, the points at which meaning shifts.
See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Ten Propositions Regarding Critical Moments in Negotiation, 20
NEGOT. J. 339, 339-340 (2004).
10. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 14 NEGOT. J. 367,
371 (1998) ("What emerges from the dispute resolution research is the extreme importance which
people.., place on being treated in a way that enhances their feelings of self-worth and personal
dignity"); Bert R. Brown, The Effects of Need to Maintain Face on InterpersonalBargaining,4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL, 107, 109 (1968) (discussing early research on face saving); White,
supra note 1, at 102 (noting importance of face "has long been recognized"). See also DOUGLAS
STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS, HOW TO Discuss WHAT MATTERS MOST 111 (1999)

("Difficult conversations threaten identity"); Madan N. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, Unfairness,
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whether about deeply held values or irrelevant nonissues, conflict produces
ego-threat,"'" which greatly complicates conflict resolution.' 2 When a
party's pride is wounded during negotiation, even acceptable offers may be
rejected out of spite.13
Much invaluable work on this subject has been done from behavioral or
social psychological perspectives. 14 However, for the most part, these
perspectives do not address the nature of the self, or why issues of self and
identity arise in negotiation and mediation. 5 Developmental psychoanalytic
theory can help address these questions, as discussed below.16

Anger and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 208, 210 (1996) (discussing wounded pride and spite in negotiations).
1I. Carsten W. De Dreu & Dan van Knippenberg, The Possessive Self as a Barrierto Conflict
Resolution: Effects of Mere Ownership, Process Accountability, and Self-Concept Clarity on
Competitive Cognitions and Behavior, 89 J. PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 355 (2005).
12. Kenneth Cloke, Mediation, Ego and I: Who, Exactly, Is in Conflict?, in HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY

PSYCHOTHERAPY:

TOWARD

AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF EFFECTIVE

PSYCHOTHERAPY 117, 118 (William O'Donohue & Steven R. Graybar eds., 2008) (issues relating to
the "ego" and the "I" are the "central problem in conflict resolution").
13. See Roy F. Baumeister & David A. Butz, Roots of Hate, Violence and Evil, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF HATE 87, 94-95 (Robert J. Steinberg ed., 2005) (citing Brown, supranote 10). See
also Robert S. Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation:How to Manage Fearand Anger, 14 NEGOT. J.
161, 173-174 (1998) (explaining that angry opponents may "hold to untenable positions that will
cost them money or even provoke wars."); Pillutla & Murnighan, supra note 10, at 211
("[P]erceptions that an offer is unfair can also lead to anger and wounded pride, and, ultimately, to a
greater likelihood that an offer will be rejected."); Eric van Ginkel, The Mediator as Face-Giver,20
NEGOT. J. 475, 479 (2004) ("[Rleduction in flexibility in the bargaining process may be an
indication of a face concern."); Morton Deutsch, The Face of Bargaining,9 OPERATIONS RES. 886,
896 (1961) (same). On issues of face generally in social interactions, a classic work is Erving
Goffman, On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, in INTERACTION
RITUAL: ESSAYS INFACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 5-46 (Transaction Publishers ed. 2005) (1967).
14. See Max H. Bazerman et al., Negotiation, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 280-86 (2000)
(tracing history of social psychological study of negotiation).
15. Additionally, these approaches do not focus on the importance of psychological
differences between individuals. Cf Bazerman, supra note 14, at 281 (arguing that focusing on
"individual differences" is of "limited use"). For a review of the self in social psychology, see
Matthew D. Lieberman, Principles,Processes and Puzzles of Social Cognition: An Introductionfor
the Special Issue on Social Cognitive Neuroscience, 28 NEUROIMAGE 745, 750 (2005) ("The self is
as strange as psychological phenomena get.").
16. There is currently a "theoretical pluralism" within psychoanalysis. See Leo Rangell, An
Analysis of the Course of Psychoanalysis, The Case for a Unitary Theory, 23 PSYCHOANALYTIC
PSYCHOL. 217, 218 (2006). For reasons of space, not all of the current views can be dealt with here.

185
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A.

Margaret Mahler on the Separation/IndividuationProcess

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, developed his now
famous theories regarding the importance of childhood experience for later
development, largely by extrapolation, working backward from the analysis
of adult memories and fantasies. 17 After Freud, a number of analytic
theorists concentrated on direct observation of infants and children.
For example, Margaret Mahler and her colleagues began exploring the
way the sense of self develops by observing infants interacting with their
mothers beginning in the 1950s and for decades thereafter. 18 Mahler
concluded that the infant is predominantly in a sleeplike "autistic" phase
after birth. 9 Three to four weeks after birth, the infant experiences himself2 "
and mother as enveloped within a common boundary in a symbiotic
relationship.2 1 "Mirroring" by the mother, and mutual cuing foster the
beginning of identity formation.22 Sensory discrimination between self and
other begins to emerge in a rudimentary form at 2about
four to five months in
3
the early stages of the "differentiation subphase.
The practicing subphase. During the "practicing subphase," the period
from ten or twelve months to sixteen or eighteen months, 24 the infant
explores the world with a sense of omnipotence derived largely from the
sense that he shares in his mother's powers. 25 The child walks freely with an

17. JAY R. GREENBERG & STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, OBJECT RELATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY 119 (1983).
18. See MARGARET S. MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT,
SYMBIOSIS AND INDIVIDUATION xxiii-xxv (1975) [hereinafter MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH]. A
classic overview of Mahler's work is contained in Greenberg & Mitchell, supra note 17, at 274-28 1.
19. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 41 (defining the so-called "autistic
phase").
20. Gendered terms such as "himself' or "herself' are used at different times in this paper for
the sake of linguistic efficiency.
21. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 44-45 (defining the so-called
"symbiotic phase").
22. MARGARET S. MAHLER, The SELECTED PAPERS OF MARGARET S. MAHLER, VOL. I,
SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION 86-87 (1979) [hereinafter MAHLER, SELECTED PAPERS]. For example,
mother sees her infant smile and reach for a toy. Id. Then, mother smiles in return and hands her
infant the toy. Id. Mirroring would also include the familiar type of activity where mother responds
to her infant's vocalizations by repeating them back, or where she responds to the infant's activity by
engaging in the same or similar activity.
23. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 52-54; GREENBERG & MITCHELL,
supranote 17, at 275.
24. MAHLER, SELECTED PAPERS, supra note 22, at 126.
25. Id. at 88.
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upright posture, is elated, and views "[t]he world [as] his oyster. ' , 6 The
infant's natural narcissism is at its peak.27
The rapprochement subphase. In the middle of his second year, the

child begins to discover that "contrary to his earlier narcissistic sense of
omnipotence, he is, in fact, a very small person in a very big world. 28

These "terrible twos" are a time of struggle and conflict. 29 The child both
wants and needs mother's help, but also needs to deny that he is dependent
upon others.3 °

As a result, there is a great deal of ambivalence, with a tendency for the
child to mentally "split" mother into a "good" mother and a "bad" mother. 31
The child cannot yet understand others as complex people who will
sometimes meet his needs but at other times frustrate them. This is the
"rapprochement crisis. ' 3
Self and object constancy. Separation from mother and independent

functioning become possible as the child develops the capacity to internalize
an image or representation of mother in his mind.34 The child's internal
representation of a supportive mother becomes, in effect, a durable, mental
"object," an object upon which he can rely.35 He will then
36 become less
dependent upon having his actual, physical mother with him.

26.

MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 71; MAHLER, SELECTED PAPERS,

supranote 22, at 126.
27.

MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 70-71; GREENBERG & MITCHELL,

supranote 17, at 276.
28.

Id.at 277; MAHLER, SELECTED PAPERS, supranote 22, at 128.

29. GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 278; MAHLER, SELECTED PAPERS, supra note
22, at 128 (noting infant's "intense negativity" and "dramatic fighting" with mother during
rapprochement).
30. GREEN1BERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 278.
31.

MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 84, 229; GREENBERG & MITCHELL,

supra note 17, at 278 (noting that splitting of good and bad representations are characteristics of the
rapprochement crisis). One reason for the splitting is that the child wishes to insulate the "good"
mother or the "good" object from his aggressive or destructive urges. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL.
BIRTH, supra note 18, at 84, 99, 108.
32. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 98, 228-229.
33. Id. at 95-100, 228-229.
34. Id. at 109-10.
35. Id. at I10. The psychoanalytic concept of the "object" is a complex one; its full
complexity cannot be dealt with in this article for reasons of space.
36.

GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 279.
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It is thus the development of "object constancy"-"the ability to evoke a
self-soothing internal representation of a need gratifying [mental] object
when the object is not present" 3 7-that resolves the rapprochement crisis.
As the infant develops the capacity to hold images of mother and others
in his mind, he also becomes able to conceive of himself as a person with a
selfhood that endures over time.38 He acquires, in other words, the capacity
for "self-constancy," the capacity for self-representation and an
understanding of himself as a separate person.39
Self and object constancy includes the capacity to integrate both positive
and negative aspects of self and/or others into a whole.4 ° Ideally, this
resolves the splitting that took place during childhood. 41 Otherwise, the
child may continue to mentally
•
42 split others, to relate to them as all-bad or
all-good, throughout his life.
Ideally, adults mature in object constancy
throughout their lives.4 3
Significance for mediation. Mahler's work suggests that the sense of
identity is forged in the crucible of early conflict. It emerges by necessity as
we are each forced to deal with conflict with the environment, including
other people. It is not surprising, then, that our sense of personhood bears
the stamp of its early, often frustrated, nonverbal origins. That is why we
experience
conflict as implicating the value and even the existence of the
44
self.
On the other hand, as Mahler's work shows, the hallmark of human
maturity is the capacity to hold a stable, mature view of oneself and others as

37.

William K. Hahn, Developing Object Constancy in Group Psychotherapy, 43 INT'L. J.

GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 223 (1993) (citing G. ADLER, BORDERLINE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY & ITS

TREATMENT (1985) and A. H. Modell, "The Holding Environment" and the Therapeutic Action of
Psychoanalysis,24 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N. 285 (1976)).

38. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 223 (noting the child will also
develop "a measure of self-constancy, the sense of 'an enduring individuality,"' although the precise
process by which this occurs is difficult to trace).
39. Id.; see also GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 300-301 (discussing the self as
self-representation in Mahler's work).
40. Hahn, supra note 37, at 223 (object constancy includes the ability to integrate both positive
and negative aspects of the self and nurturing other).
41. GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 279 ("Libidinal object constancy presupposes
the unification of good and bad representations of the object ... ").
42. MAHLER ET AL., PSYCHOL. BIRTH, supra note 18, at 107-108 (linking splitting in
rapprochement and borderline disturbances); GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 279
(discussing same).
43. Id. at 279.
44. For more on the significance of the tension between the early, nonverbal experience of the
self in infancy and the later development of the sense of self and ego, see infra notes 108-116 and
accompanying text (discussing work of Muqaddam and Almaas).

188
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people with both positive and negative characteristics. 45 Since each party in
conflict tends to view the other as the "all bad" adversary of the "all good"
self,4 6 understanding and learning to encourage "self and object constancy"
is extremely important for mediators.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the later phases of the
individuation process described by Mahler almost exactly parallel what I call
"the IDR cycle," the cycle of narcissistic inflation, deflation, and realistic
resolution that typically occurs in mediation.47

The similarity exists, I

believe, because what Mahler describes-and what mediation epitomizesis the process of reality testing as that process unfolds for human beings. It
is in some sense always a dialectical and difficult process, and one that
inherently involves narcissistic challenges. 48 The IDR cycle exemplifies this
dialectical process.
B. Intersubjectivity in Infancy andBeyond
Daniel Stem and other researchers also conducted observational studies,

including frame-by-frame studies of face-to face play between mothers and
infants. They criticized Mahler's views, especially the view that the early
infant is autistic and symbiotic. 49 Instead, they argued the early infant has a

nonverbal sense of self even in the early days of infancy.5 °

45. GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 279 (noting object constancy for Mahler
presupposes capacity to integrate both good and bad representations of others).
46. Cf John Gartner, The Capacity to Forgive: An Object Relations Perspective, 27 J.
RELIGION & HEALTH, 313, 316 (1988) (discussing splitting and the importance of understanding
others have both good and bad qualities).
47. See infra Part IV (discussing the IDR cycle).
48. "[T]he wish to absolutely assert the self and deny everything outside one's own mental
omnipotence must sometimes crash against the implacable reality of the other." JESSICA BENJAMIN,
LIKE SUBJECTS, LOVE OBJECTS 47 (1995) (emphasis added).
49. DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF THE INFANT 240 (2000) [hereinafter
STERN, INTERPERSONAL WORLD] (Mahler's ideas regarding early symbiosis are "problematic"). See

also id. at xiii (arguing Stem's view of development "does away with the need to conceptualize
phases of... 'autism' ... and 'symbiosis'); Phyllis Tyson, Separation-Individuation, Object
Constancy

and Affect

Regulation,

in

THE

LANGUAGE

OF

EMOTIONS,

DEVELOPMENT,

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY & TECHNIQUE 69, 74 (Salman Akhtar & Harold Blum eds., 2005) [hereinafter
LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONS] (discussing rejection of autistic and symbiotic labels).

Criticism of

Mahler has also extended beyond the intersubjective theorists. See Gyorgy Gergely, Approaching
Mahler: New Perspectives on Normal Autism, Symbiosis, Splitting and LibidinalObject Constancy
from Cognitive Developmental Theory, 48 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 1197 (2000)
(summarizing criticisms of Mahler from intersubjective and other theorists, but also integrating
Mahler's work into recent theories); but cf Fred Pine, Mahler's Concepts of "Symbiosis" and

189
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In this view, the infant is primed from the beginning to be interested in
others." The infant's developmental task, then, is not so much separation
from mother, as the creation of ties with others,52 including mother. The
development of the capacity for mutual recognition between mother and
infant is particularly emphasized.53
As Jessica Benjamin, a leading intersubjective theorist argues, this
"amplifies [Mahler's] separation-individuation theory by ... stressing the
simultaneity of connection and separation. 54 This is a "psychology of
mutually sensitive minds."55
Significancefor mediation. The intersubjective perspective emphasizes
the importance of understanding the self, not in isolation, but within the
context of human interaction. As a result, it yields interesting insights about
conflict and its resolution.
For example, intersubjective theorists point out that during therapeutic
impasse the therapist may be required or may wish to make a frank
admission to the client of the therapist's inability to resolve the impasse for
the client.
This confession of powerlessness helpfully returns the
responsibility to the client to decide whether to commit to moving forward
with the process. Often, this is exactly what is needed to move to resolution.
A similar principle is also applicable to impasse in mediation. 56
C. Attachment, Mentalizationand Reflective Functioning
The nature of the bonds (attachments) between mother and child has
also been examined by attachment research and theory. In one series of
experiments, twelve-month-old infants were placed in the "strange situation"
of having their mothers leave the room for short periods of time. What

Separation-Individuation:Revisited, Reevaluated, and Refined, 52 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N

511 (2004) (responding to critics of Mahler).
50.
51.

STERN, INTERPERSONAL WORLD, supra note 49, at xiv, xviii.
JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE 18 (1988) (quoting Daniel N. Stem); DANIEL N.
STERN, THE PRESENT MOMENT IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 85 (2004) [hereinafter
STERN, PRESENT MOMENT] ("infants are born with minds that are especially attuned to other

minds").
52.

STERN, INTERPERSONAL WORLD, supra note 49, at xiii.

53. BENJAMIN, supra note 48, at 35.
54. Id. (noting, however, that Daniel Stem sees more difference between intersubjective theory
and Mahler's theories).
55. STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supra note 51, at xvi, 85. See also Colwyn Trevarthen, The
Concept and Foundations of Infant Intersubjectivity, in INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND
EMOTION IN EARLY ONTOGENY 15, 16 (Braten Stein ed., 1998).

56.

For a detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 178-189 and accompanying text,

especially note 187.

190
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psychologists call "securely attached" infants were visibly, but not acutely,
distressed when their mothers left the room and would greet them happily

when they returned. Others would either become anxious or, alternatively,57
avoidant, refusing even to recognize their mothers' absence or return.

Later research has also identified a disorganized style of attachment, in
which there is no clear coping strategy.58
Peter Fonagy and his colleagues have emphasized that with secure

attachment the infant receives caregiving that implicitly treats the child as an

agent,59 which fosters a sense of self. For example, the caregiver might
approach the child to ask, "Do you want your diaper changed?" or similar

questions. 60 This enables "the child to find in the caregiver's mind.., an
image of himself as motivated by beliefs, feelings, and intentions.'
Through this process, a core sense of selfhood develops.

62

Maternal

mirroring also helps the infant learn to recognize and differentiate himself
from others.63

Over time, the child begins to realize that his mind mediates and
64
interacts with his experience; this is the development of "mentalization."
This develops "reflective functioning," the capacity to distinguish and
understand mental states both in one's self and others.65

57.

M. AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT 31-33, 59-63 (1978); see also ALAN

E. KAZDIN, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA PSYCHOL. 284, 287 (2000) (discussing attachment generally).
58. Mary Main & Judith Solomon, Procedures for Identifying Infants as
Disorganized/DisorientedDuring the Ainsworth Strange Situation, in ATTACHMENT IN THE
PRESCHOOL YEARS 121, 123 (M.T. Greenberg, D. Cicchetti & E.M. Cummings eds., 1990).
59. PETER FONAGY ET AL., AFFECT REGULATION, MENTALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SELF 53-54 (2004).

60. Id. at 53.
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 54.
63. Mirroring in this context may include not only pure reflection but also signaling about the
difference between the self and other. For example, when the infant smiles but his mother returns
the smile in an exaggerated way, the infant learns there is a difference between his mother's
emotions and his own. Id. at 177, 201-02. For more on the "social biofeedback theory of affect
mirroring" developed by Fonagy and his colleagues, especially Gyorgy Gergeley, to explain the way
mirroring works, see id. at 145-202. Similarly, through pretend play the infant learns to distinguish
between reality and appearance, as, for example, the difference between a real bear and a pretend
one. Id. at 54, 258-89, 304-06, 308-12.
64. Id. at 3 ("Mentalization... is the process by which we realize that having a mind mediates
our experience of the world."); id. at 54 ("the caregiver's capacity to observe the moment-to-moment
changes in the child's mental state is critical in the development of mentalizing capacity.").
65. Id. at 23.
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As a result, the individual becomes able "to distinguish inner from outer
reality, pretend from 'real' modes of functioning, and intrapersonal mental
and emotional processes from interpersonal communications. 66 Research
has confirmed the link between coherent mental functioning and

attachment.67
Significancefor mediation. Fonagy and his colleagues emphasize that

reflective functioning is particularly important during interpersonal conflict.
Why? "Conflict-or rather its adaptive resolution-prototypically calls for
the perception both of the self and of the other in relation to the self,
requiring individuals to reconcile their own legitimate claims with concern
for the other., 68 The capacities for reflective functioning and mentalization
thus constitute an important "potential mediator of psychosocial risk. 69
D. Parent/ChildInteractionand the Psychology of the Self (Narcissism)

Parents' reactions to a child during the formative years of childhood
may also shape a child's sense of self in other ways. Heinz Kohut, the
founder of "self psychology," was one of the earliest theorists to emphasize
that the failure to react enthusiastically to a child's achievements may be
experienced as a rejection and even active destruction of a child's young
self. 70 The child needs, instead, a form of mirroring that supports her

66. Id. at 25. Fonagy and his colleagues have also hypothesized the existence of an underlying
neural structure, called the Interpersonal Interpretive Mechanism (IIM), which serves as the
mechanism for processing new experiences and social information. The IIM underlies mentalization
and reflective functioning, but may also have functions beyond them. Id.at 124-125. The IIM is
probably located in the medial prefrontal cortex. Id. at 131-132.
67. For example, when expectant mothers were asked to describe their childhoods, mothers of
children who later became securely attached described their childhoods more coherently than other
mothers. Peter Fonagy et al., Maternal Representations of Attachment During Pregnancy Predict
the Organization of Infant-Mother Attachment at One Year ofAge, 62 CHILD DEV. 891, 901 (1991).
This was true even if the mothers' own childhoods had been difficult. Id. By analyzing the mothers'
level of verbal coherence in these prenatal interviews, and factors related to the mothers' mental
organization, researchers were able to predict with a high degree of accuracy whether the mothers'
as yet unborn offspring would later be securely attached. Id. This demonstrates the link between
coherent mental functioning and attachment. Conversely, with inaccurate mirroring and inadequate
attunement, a false or alien self may be internalized. FONAGY, supra note 59, at 11-12. See also
William M. Singletary, The Internal Monster: An Aspect of Hostile Self and Object Constancy-Discussion of Tyson's Chapter "Separation-Individuation, Object Constancy and Affect
Regulation," in LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONS, supra note 49, at 83.
68. FONAGY, supra note 59, at 62.
69. Id. at 16.
70.

HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF THE SELF: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE

PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDERS 120 (1971) (stating "a
relationship to an empathically approving and accepting parent is one of the preconditions for the
original establishment of a firm cathexis of the self.").
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exhibitionistic displays, 7' although ultimately she must mature beyond
them.72
When a child's parents are too cold and self-involved or humiliate her
for failures during the process of individuation, she may develop a sense of
inadequacy and shame, or a belief she is loved only if she performs
adequately for them.73 The child may then deal with this shame and
vulnerability (and her fear of abandonment by the parents) by adopting a
defensive stand of grandiosity and hostility.
In short, she develops a
troubled relationship to the self, which is potentially a forerunner of a
narcissistic disorder.75
When a Narcissistic Personality Disorder develops, the person develops
a sense of grandiosity and entitlement that is unrealistic and out of
proportion to life circumstances.76
When entitlement is threatened,

aggression and hostility are characteristic. 77 Compassion and conscience
may also be almost entirely missing. Other characteristics of the disorder

71. Id. at 116.
72. Id. at 108 ("The gradual recognition of the realistic imperfections and limitations of the
self... is in general a precondition for mental health."). Details of the rather technical debate
between Heinz Kohut and Otto Kemberg about certain aspects of the etiology of narcissism are not
dealt with in this article. For a discussion of this issue, see Arnold M. Cooper, Narcissism, in
AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 297 (S. Arieti ed., 1959), reprinted in ESSENTIAL PAPERS,

supra note 2, 135-139.
73. Arnold Rothstein, The Theory of Narcissism: An Object Relations Perspective 66
PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 35 (1979), reprinted in ESSENTIAL PAPERS, supra note 2, 309, 314-16

[hereinafter Rothstein, Theory] (in response to mothering which is not empathetic, the toddler "feels
a possibility of love only when he performs adequately in a manner that will elicit a maternal
smile"); William K. Hahn, Shame: CountertransferenceIdentifications in Individual Psychotherapy,
37 PSYCHOTHERAPY 10, 15 (2000) (avoidance reactions to shame include narcissistic defenses such
as grandiosity and mistrustful detachment, which are designed to compensate for repeated failures in
empathic attunement). Shame as a response to difficulties during the practicing period may be an
inherent part of the process of biological maturation of the infant brain. See ALLAN N. SCHORE,
AFFECT REGULATION & THE REPAIR OF THE SELF 156 (2003).

74. Rothstein, Theory, supra note 73, at 316-17.
75. Peter Fonagy and his colleagues have also theorized that the child who experiences the self
as "empty" or alien may be predisposed to the development of Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
FONAGY, supra note 59, at 10-12. See also Otto Kernberg, Identity: Recent Findings and Clinical
Implications, LXXV PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 969, 980-81 (2006) (inaccurate mirroring may predispose
to Narcissistic Personality Disorder; the importance of the early capacity for differentiation between
self and other must be emphasized).
76. AARON T. BECK ET AL., Narcissistic Personality Disorder, in COGNITIVE THERAPY OF
PERSONALITY DISORDERS 242-52 (2003).

77. Id. at 245.
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include:

fantasies

of unlimited

success

or

power,

interpersonal

exploitiveness and arrogant, haughty behaviors and attitudes.78

Everyone has these tendencies to some degree. 79 As Kohut and Wolf
have observed, however, the degree of stability and coherence of the sense
of self can differ widely in different people. 80 For example, while narcissists
have a stable but grandiose sense of self, those with "identity diffusion" lack
a clear sense of themselves and others.8' One person may have a self strong
enough to remain firm in the face of conflict, another may not.82 Research in
social psychology supports these observations, 83 and th
the fi
finding that
84
narcissists become aggressive in response to ego threat.

78. According to the American Psychiatric Association, the diagnostic criteria for a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder are:
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack
of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:
(1) has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents,
expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements);(2)
is
preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love;
(3) believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or
should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions);
(4) requires excessive admiration;
(5) has a sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations;
(6) is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own
ends;
(7) lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs
of
others;
(8) is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her;
(9) shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 717 (4th

ed. 2006) (punctuation as in original).
79. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 219-20; Constantine Sedikides et al., Are Normal Narcissists
PsychologicallyHealthy? Self-Esteem Matters, 87 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 400 (2004) (discussing
normal narcissism).
80. Heinz Kohut & Ernest Wolf, The Disorders of the Self and Their Treatment: An Outline,
59 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 414 (1978), reprintedin ESSENTIAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at 175, 177
("The adult self may ... exist in states of varying degrees of coherence, from cohesion to
fragmentation; in states of varying degrees of vitality, from vigor to enfeeblement; in states of
varying degrees of functional harmony, from order to chaos.").
81. Kernberg, supra note 75, at 988 (arguing that borderlines typify the syndrome of identity
diffusion, which is characterized by a lack of integration of the concept of self and others; but "in the
case of narcissistic personality disorder, what is most characteristic is the presence of an apparently
integrated but pathological, grandiose self, contrasting sharply with a severe incapacity to develop an
integrated view of significant others.").
82. Kohut & Wolf, supra note 80, at 414 (noting that a strong self allows us to tolerate victory
or defeat, success or failure).
83. See Brad J. Bushman & Roy F. Baumeister, Threatened Egotism, Narcissism and SelfEsteem and Direct and DisplacedAggression: Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?, 75 J.
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E. Significance of PsychoanalyticDevelopmental Findingsfor Mediation
Psychoanalytic developmental theory consistently recognizes that with
the development of a healthy sense of self, human beings also develop a
reality-based and objective, but ideally also self-reflective, sense of self-andother. This is what Peter Fonagy calls "reflective functioning."85 It is also,
roughly, what Margaret Mahler calls "self and object constancy, ' 6 and what
87
intersubjective theorists describe as the capacity for mutual recognition,
that is, the capacity for recognition, not just of one's self, but of others. 88
This is especially important during conflict. 89 Stated in practical terms,
those who are able to function with adequate objectivity about themselves

PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 227-28 (1998) ("High self-esteem... may be stable and largely

impervious to evaluations by others, or it may demand frequent confirmation and validation by
others and be prone to fluctuate in response to daily events"); Christine H. Jordan et al., Secure and
Defensive High Self-Esteem, 85 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 969, 975 (2003) (noting that high selfesteem ". . . can assume relatively secure or defensive forms that relate to whether an individual
possesses less conscious, negative self-feelings"); T. S. Stucke & S. L. Sporer, When a Grandiose
Self-Image Is Threatened. Narcissism and Self-Concept Clarity as Predictors of Negative Emotions
and Aggression Following Ego-Threat, 70 J. PERSONALITY 509, 530 (2002) ("our findings can be
seen as additional evidence for the notion that individuals with a positive but unstable and insecure
self-view are especially vulnerable to ego-threats.").
84. Bushman & Baumeister, supra note 83, at 227; see also Tanja S. Stucke, Who's to Blame?
Narcissism and Self-Serving Attributions Following Feedback, 17 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 465, 466
(2003) ("after negative feedback narcissistic individuals are prone to negative reactions directed
toward others").
85. See supra notes 62-65, 68-69 and accompanying text.
86.

JOYCE EDWARD ET AL., SEPARATIONINDIVIDUATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION 154 (2d

ed. 1992) ("It is the achievement of self and object constancy over time that enables human beings to
experience themselves as members of the family of humankind, and, at the same time, makes it
possible for each of us to endure and adapt to the inevitable experiences of aloneness .. "). See
also supra notes 34-40 (capacity to know oneself and others in self and object constancy).
I am indebted to William Singletary for pointing out that there are similarities in the concepts of
reflective functioning and self and object constancy. Communication with William Singletary (Dec.
2007). See also Gergely, supra note 49, at 1214-22 (integrating Mahler's concept of object
constancy with recent psychoanalytic theory, including the work of Fonagy).
87. See supra notes 48-52 (discussing mutual recognition in intersubjective theory).
88. For similar concepts in the work of Kohut and Kemberg, see, e.g., HEINZ KOHUT, HOW
DOES ANALYSIS CURE? 52, 70, 77, 79 (Arnold Goldberg & Paul E. Stepansky eds., 1984); Kernberg,
supra note 75, at 981 (emphasizing the importance of "the early capacity for differentiation between
self and other").
89. See supra notes 39-46, 56, 68, 82-84 and accompanying text.
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and others--or who can be encouraged to do so-will do better in
mediation. 90

9
Another significant theme is the importance of mirroring. ' 92 Through
mirroring and its intersubjective correlate, mutual recognition, the self
comes to know itself, and to relax in the secure awareness of its rightful
place in the world.
Conversely, there will be heightened sensitivity when the self is unstable
or vulnerable. The research on narcissism thus supports the view that much
is a defensive
of the hostility and sense of insult parties exhibit in mediation
93
vulnerability.
or
shame
of
feelings
underlying
to
reaction
Due to the primacy of issues of self and identity, the process of
mediation is dominated, not just by narcissistic defenses such as grandiosity,
but by reactions to those defensive or aggressive postures. For example,
grandiosity or overconfidence will often be followed by disappointment and
94
deflation. This causes the IDR cycle, discussed below.

1I.

OTHER VIEWS OF SELF AND IDENTITY

In considering questions of self and identity, most of us assume that the
person we refer to as I'T, or "me" is a unified, central, executive self. While
psychoanalysis generally endorses this assumption, it has been questioned
by others, as discussed below.

90. A similar point is made in two recent perceptive studies of mediation. See Cloke, supra
note 12, at 127 (drawing on the work of Sigmund and Anna Freud, among others, and noting "our
purpose as mediators is... to develop [parties'] sense of self and other"). See also Richard
McGuigan & Nancy Popp, The Self in Conflict: The Evolution of Mediation, 25 CONFLICT RESOL.
Q. 221 (2007) (discussing the "authoring mindset," which, as distinguished from the "affiliative" or
"instrumental" mindsets, is more able to take into consideration the views of self and other.
McGuigan and Popp rely on constructive developmental theory, id. at 223, as articulated in Robert
Kegan's work. See ROBERT KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF: PROBLEM & PROCESS IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Kegan sought to establish a tradition outside of classical psychoanalysis,
based largely on the work of Jean Piaget, id. at 3-4, but which could be used to augment the work of
various psychoanalytic theorists, including Mahler. Id. at 4. He argued his approach would be
useful for therapists and counselors. But see K. Eriksen, The ConstructiveDevelopmental Theory of
Robert Kegan, 14 FAM. J. 290 (2006) (arguing Kegan's work has not received wide enough
acceptance in the counseling community).
91. See supra notes 22, 63, 71-72.
92. Details on the distinctions between mirroring and recognition in psychoanalysis will not be
dealt with here. But see Stephen A. Mitchell, Juggling Paradoxes: Commentary on the Work of
JessicaBenjamin, I STUDIES 1NGENDER & SEXUALITY 251-55 (2000). Cf Gergely, supra note 49,
at 1206-10 (discussing points of similarity and difference in concepts of mirroring in Mahler and
recent theorists).
93. See supranotes 70-84 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Part IV.
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A.

The Deconstructionof the Unitary Self Buddhism and Neuroscience

In recent decades, neuroscientists have studied the way the brain shapes
who we are and who we think we are. One of their most important recent
findings has been the discovery of the "mirror neurons."95 These neurons
map the visual information we receive when we watch another's behavior on
equivalent motor representations in our own brain.96 For example, when we
watch another person reaching for a glass of water, our own brain registers
the scene as if we were reaching for the glass.97
The finding of mirror neurons and other, similar neurological systems 98
validates the psychoanalytic emphasis on mirroring and recognition. Due to
our automatic "embodied simulations" of each other, we are subtly wiring
and reconfiguring each other on a neurological level as we communicate. 99
It seems, then, that our selves are fundamentally social selves, subtly wired
for human interconnection from the earliest days. 00
Scientists have attempted to locate mechanisms in the brain that relate to
the self. However, this has resulted in what might be called a deconstruction
of the individual self. Using the deductive power of the scientific method,
coupled with brain imaging, scientists have identified different forms of

95. This discovery was first made by accident while scientists were studying macaque
monkeys. Vittorio Gallese et al., Intentional Attunement: Mirror Neurons and the Neural
Underpinnings of InterpersonalRelations, 55 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 131, 134-35 (2007).
Scientists now agree that a similar mechanism exists in humans. Id.
96.

STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supranote 51, at 78-79.

97. Id. at 79.
98. As an example of these other systems, Stem speaks about the discovery of "adaptive
oscillators," which act like clocks within our body, and are constantly reset so their rate of firing can
be adjusted to match the rate of an incoming stimulation. STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supranote 51,
at 80-81. "The result is that the outreaching arm of the person drying the dishes is perfectly
coordinated in time with the outreaching hand of the person handing over the dish." Id.
99. Gallese, supra note 95, at 143, 159 (discussing "embodied simulations" and suggesting
that due to the mirror neurons, an attuned response to a patient is automatically simulated
biologically by the patient).
100. See Daniel J. Siegel et al., Mind, Brain and Behavior, in BEHAVIOR & MEDICINE 3 (D. L.
Wedding & M.L. Stuber eds., 2006) ("the brain is a profoundly social organ of the body"). The
emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience is exploring the neuroscience of the social brain in
detail. See Beth Azar, At the Frontierof Science, 33 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. (2002); David M.
Amodio & Chris Firth, Meeting of Minds: The Medial Frontal Cortex and Social Cognition, 7
NATURE 268 (2006) (focusing on the unique role played by the medial frontal cortex of the brain in
social cognition).
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memory,'' and different self-related functions. 102 They have posited the
existence of different types of selves.'0 3 They have not found a unified
self.' 4 Some suggest doing away entirely with the concept of the little
"homunculus;" yet even so, they must grudgingly acknowledge that human
experience includes a sense of self.'0 5
As neuroscientists deconstruct the self, some gain sustenance from the
Buddhist notion that the ego, the conventional sense of self, is an illusion.
For Buddhists, all phenomena arise dependently upon and with each other,
and do not exist separately. This includes the self, which is merely a part of
the influx of phenomena "continuously arising." 106 An interesting alliance
has developed between Buddhism and neuroscience."°7

101.

DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: How RELATIONSHIPS AND THE BRAIN

INTERACT TO SHAPE WHO WE ARE 23-39 (1999).

102. Georg Northoff et al., Self Referential Processing in Our Brain-A Meta-Analysis of
Imaging Studies on the Self 31 NEUROIMAGE 440, 441 (2006) (conducting an extensive literature
review of studies of various self-related functions).
103. SIEGEL, supra note 101, at 230 ("As we can see, both developmental studies and cognitive
science appear to suggest that we have many selves"); Northoff, supra note 102, at 441 ("What
remains unclear, however, is what unites these distinct concepts of self allowing us to speak of a self
in all cases.").
104. STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supra note 51, at 39.
105. ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 190-91 (1999) (deconstructing the view of the self as a little internal

"homunculus" but acknowledging that "[w]hether we like the notion or not, something like the sense
of self does exist in the normal human mind as we go about knowing things") (emphasis added); see
also Francis Crick & Christof Koch, The Unconscious Homunculus, 2 NEURO-PSYCHOANALYSIS 311(2000).
106. Thus, for the Buddhist, "this seemingly solid, concrete, independent, self-instituting I
under its own power that appears actually does not exist at all." MARK EPSTEIN, Forms of
Emptiness: Psychodynamic, Meditative and Clinical Perspectives, in PSYCHOTHERAPY WITHOUT
THE SELF: A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE 55, 63 (2007) (quoting XIV Dalai Lama, TENZIN GYATSO,

KINDNESS, CLARITY AND INSIGHT (1984)); see also Darshan Brach, A Logic for the Magic of
Mindful Negotiation, 24 NEGOT. J. 25, 38 (2008) (discussing the Buddhist concept of co-dependent
arising); KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE BEGINNING OF OUR RELIGIOUS

TRADITIONS 283-84 (2006) (discussing the doctrine ofanatta or no-self).
107. For example, conferences have been held with neuroscientists and Buddhist monks, with
the XIV Dalai Lama himself attending. Experiments have been performed where Buddhist
meditators are linked with functional magnetic resonance imaging devices. See, e.g., J.A.
Brefczynski-Lewis et al., Neural Correlates of Attentional Expertise in Long-Term Meditation
Practitioners, 104
PROC.
NAT'L
ACAD.
SCIENCES,
11483,
available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/104/27/l1483.full.pdf+html.
See also DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE
MINDFUL BRAIN: REFLECTION AND ATIUNEMENT IN THE CULTIVATION OF WELL-BEING (2007)

[hereinafter SIEGEL, MINDFUL BRAIN] (exploring the neuroscience of mindfulness). See also Mind
and Life Institute, http://www.mindandlife.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2009).

The principal area of

shared interest has been the neuroscience of mindfulness. See infra Part IV.C.
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B. Integration of Dimensions of the Self
Elements of Buddhism and other spiritual traditions were integrated
with psychoanalytic developmental theory in the work of Faisal Muqaddam
and A.H. Almaas, who worked together for many years but ended their
collaboration in the mid-1980s. According to their view, the ego, the
conventional sense of self, is indeed created through the process Mahler and
08
others have so carefully described.
The human ego is rightly regarded as
09
achievement.
a developmental
There are, however, "tremendous implications" to the fact that the sense
of being an individual results from identifying with a self-image in the
mind."0
This is because fundamentally one's true nature is not a
psychological construction; one is a being."'
Thus, the self is considered quite real, and not an illusion in any sense.
The child experiences her self and knows her self directly during infancy,
particularly during the practicing period."12 However, she does not
recognize herself as a self because she lacks the capacity to be selfreflective. 113 By the time she becomes aware of herself as an individual, she
is experiencing herself within and through the process of selfrepresentation."l 4 As a result, she is not able to recognize
her self
l 5
independently of psychological structure or self-representation."

108. See A.H. ALMAAS, THE PEARL BEYOND PRICE, INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY INTO
BEING: AN OBJECT RELATIONS APPROACH 22 (1988) [hereinafter ALMAAS, THE PEARL].

109.

Id. at 25.

110.

Id.

11.

Id. at 27-28; Faisal Muquddam & Lama Caroline Palden, Dialogue Between Buddhist &

Diamond Logos Teachers, held by Institute for Spirituality and Psychology (Mar. 3, 1996), available

at www.instituteforspiritualityandpsychology.com/mp3s/audio.asp#sp2006.
Each self is thus an
individual being within the ground of being. Id. This emphasis on the self as a being may be
compatible with the Buddhist notion that the self is an illusion if one reads the illusory self in
Buddhism as the ego. Id.
112. ALMAAS, THE PEARL, supra note 108, at 277-278. See also A. H. ALMAAS, THE POINT OF
EXISTENCE, TRANSFORMATIONS OF NARCISSISM IN SELF-REALIZATION 59, 135, 208, 211 (1996)
[hereinafter ALMAAS, THE POINT].
113. ALMAAS, THE PEARL, supra note 108, at 59. See also A.H. ALMAAS, THE INNER JOURNEY
HOME, SOUL'S REALIZATION OF THE UNITY OF REALITY 154, 166 (2004).
114. ALMAAS, THE POINT, supra note 112, at 59.
115. Id.
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According to this view, true individuation is not complete until the
"essential" self is recognized and reintegrated. This requires a process of
both psychological and spiritual work.' 16
Psychoanalyst Mark Epstein, a practicing Buddhist, sounds similar
themes. He also emphasizes that "Eastern methods must confront
narcissistic attachments . .

. ."'

In his view, "[ft]o

understand

this

interaction is to recognize both the transformative power of meditation and
the pervasive influence of narcissism.""' 8
Significancefor mediation. During mediation, the ego, the conventional

sense of self, is a psychological reality. Each party comes to the table
seeking benefits for the ego, that is, for the self as he or she conceives of it.
Yet, it is also true that parties can have a more or less expanded sense of
who they are during the process. They can lock in, psychologically, to one
or more of the items on the bargaining table, or they can let go.
To the extent these approaches articulate a more expanded, "non-selfcentric" vision of the self,' they may be helpful to support mediators in one
of their most crucial tasks: remembering, and reminding others, that one's
identity is not contingent on the outcome of the negotiation. 2 °
If the mediator can also actually embody a deeper, more authentic sense
of self, that too is very useful. The parties will often experience this 2as
respect, a profound validation of who they are in the midst of the conflict. ' '
III. WORKING WITH THE MEDIATOR'S ISSUES OF SELF AND IDENTITY

The mediator's ability to deal with issues of self and identity is thus a
key ingredient of a successful mediation. These issues arise not only for the
parties but for the mediator as well.

116.

See, e.g., ALMAAS, THE POINT, supra note 112, at 107-08 (1996)

(although depth

psychology recognizes the importance of dissolving distorted self-images, one can go even further
and dissolve even realistic self-images in order to access the essential self).
117. Mark Epstein, Meditative Transformations of Narcissism, 18 J. TRANSPERSONAL
PSYCHOL. 143-158 (1986), reprintedin PSYCHOTHERAPY WITHOUT THE SELF, supra note 106, at 39.
118. Id.
119. This is a phrase coined by Buddhist psychoanalyst Jeffrey Rubin. Jeffrey B. Rubin,
PsychoanalysisIs Self-Centered, in SOUL ON THE COUCH, SPIRITUALITY, RELIGION AND MORALITY
IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYSIS 79, 80 (Charles Spezzano & Gerald J. Gargiulo eds., 1997).
120. The relevance of meditation to this aspect of mediation practice is discussed infra Part
III.C.

121.

For more on respect in mediation, see discussion infra at notes 159-61, 190-91, 194 and

accompanying text. See also infra Part IV.E.

200

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol10/iss2/1

18

Bader: The Psychology of Mediation: Issues of Self and Identity and the

[Vol. 10: 2, 2010]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

A.

Dealingwith the Mediator's Own Issues of Self and Identity

As a first principle, one should expect that one's own issues of self and
identity will arise to varying degrees during mediation. Knowledge of one's
relationship to narcissistic defenses, such as aggression, is important. It is
also helpful to have a sense of the nature of one's usual projections on
others.
For example, self-observation may reveal one party has become an
idealized version of one's father, while another faintly echoes one's mother,
sister, or brother. There are countless possible permutations.
Understanding these projections will help to unpack one's reactions and
return to neutrality when parties become difficult or challenging. In many
ways, this commitment to inner neutrality is an essential prerequisite to a
truly well functioning outward neutrality. 21
B.

The ProfessionalEgo Ideal

By analogy to the psychoanalytic literature on group therapy leadership,
we know that the "grandiose professional ego ideal"'1 3 is one of the key
narcissistic dangers for the group leader. This grandiose self may desire to
be seen as a "selfless helper."' 24 It may wish
125 to be all powerful, all knowing
and all loving as a defense to vulnerability.
Paradoxically, the narcissistic leader in us may have the most difficulty
tolerating the narcissism of clients, and may tend to devalue or avoid hearing
them. 126 Classifying others as narcissistic may provide a way to project
one's own narcissistic
tendencies onto others and to defensively disown
27
them by doing so.
Optimal finctioning requires us instead to "accept that the grandiose
ideal is an illusion and untenable ... and to rebuild a more realistic
professional
ego ideal that accepts the limits of our power, knowledge, and
128
love."'

122.
123.
Topic, 53
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See also infra note 145 (discussing neutrality).
Robert L. Weber & Jerome S. Gans, The Group Therapist's Shame: A Much Undiscussed
INT'L. J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 395, 399 (2003).
Horwitz, supra note 2, at 222.
Weber & Gans, supra note 123, at 399.
Horwitz, supranote 2, at 231-32.
Id. at 233.
Weber & Gans, supra note 123, at 414.
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Ironically, when things become difficult during mediation, it may
actually be one's capacity to release a grandiose self-image that is of most
service to the parties.' 2 9 The hallmark of the competent mediator will be a
realistic professional ideal, accompanied by a steady commitment to clients
during the mediation. 30
C. Presence, Mindfulness and Release of Identity

During mediation, the parties continuously scan the mediator's

presence, attempting to discern her strengths and weaknesses. 3 '

This

happens very quickly. For example, it takes just one to ten seconds,
according to Daniel Stem, "to make meaningful groupings of stimuli
emanating from people, to compose functional units of our behavior
performances, and to permit consciousness to arise."' 3 2 Stem refers to this

short "process unit" as the "present moment,"' 33 or "the psychological
present"'' 34 in therapy and in negotiation. 135 Viewed from this perspective,
mediation is a fast-moving performance art, one that36takes place within the
rapidly unfolding present moments of the mediation. 1
To help develop the capacity for moment-to-moment attunement,
Professor Riskin and others have suggested that Buddhist mindfulness
practice should be used by mediators, and included in the training
curriculum. 37 In mindfulness practice, one remains "aware, moment to
129. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
130. Cf Horowitz, supra note 2, at 223-24 (noting effective therapists seek to maintain a steady
commitment to clients not their own gratification or an unrealistic sense of their own prowess).
131. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Jean Decety, From the Perception of Action to the
Understandingof Intention, 2 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 561, 563-65 (2001) ("The medial
prefrontal cortex is consistently activated by... tasks in which subjects think about their own or
others' mental states."); STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supra note 51, at 79 (explaining that the visual
information we receive when we watch another gets mapped onto equivalent motor representations
in our own brain by the activity of the mirror neurons).
132. STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supra note 51, at 41.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 50.
135. Stem drew an analogy between "present moment(s)" in therapy and negotiation in an
article he published in an edition of the Negotiation Journal devoted to critical moments in
negotiation. Daniel N. Stem, The PresentMoment as a CriticalMoment, 20 NEGOT. J. 365 (2004).
I assume the analogy also extends to mediation.
136. See Carrie MenkeI-Meadow, CriticalMoments in Negotiation: Implicationsfor Research,
Pedagogy, and Practice, 20 NEGOT. J. 341, 346-47 (2004) ("Our practice as negotiators and
mediators draws from many fields of insights and virtuosity. We seem to be adding an explicit focus
on the performance arts as well, for we are indeed 'performers' too."). See also Susskind, supra
note 9, at 339-40 (likening skills in negotiation to jazz improvisation and acting skills).
137. Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Trainingfor Dispute Resolution, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 79, 86-88 (2004). Buddhism has had a profound impact on mediation. For example,
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moment, without judgment, of one's bodily sensations, thoughts, emotions,

139
and consciousness.' ' 138 This disciplined form 14
of
can
0 reflective functioning

help inhibit reactivity in situations of conflict.
From the perspective of issues of self and identity, the great value of
mindfulness practice, or other forms of meditation, 141 is that, as long as they

are used judiciously and appropriately, 142 they can help release the usual

sense of self-identity. 143 The transient nature of habitual thoughts and
144
feelings becomes more evident when set against a backdrop of awareness.
Attitudinal and other biases also become more evident. This can help
mediators maintain neutrality.' 4 5

in recent years Zen Buddhist priest and author Norman Fischer has participated as a trainer in
mediation training programs held at the Center for Mediation in Law with Gary J. Friedman and
Jack Himmelstein. A forum at Harvard and part of an issue of the Harvard Negotiation Law Review
were devoted to mindfulness. See Symposium, Mindfulness in the Law and ADR, 7 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 1 (2002).
138. Riskin, supra note 137, at 83; see also Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On
the PotentialContributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients,
7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002).
139. Cf SIEGEL, supra note 101, at 205 (drawing an analogy between mindfulness and
reflective functioning in secure attachment and citing Peter Fonagy & Mary Target, Attachment and
Reflective Function: TheirRole in Self-Organization,9 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 679 (1997)).
140. Kirk Warren Brown et al., Mindfulness: Theoretical Foundations and Evidence for Its
Salutary Effects, 18 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 211,225 (2007) (reviewing research).
141. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, THE MEDITATIVE MIND: THE VARIETIES OF THE MEDITATIVE
EXPERIENCE (1977) (discussing a variety of meditation practices, Eastern and Western, although the
perspective is largely Buddhist).
142. On some of the dangers to the self that may attend the inappropriate use of spiritual
practice, and particularly the dangers of self-deception in groups, see Frances Vaughan, A Question
of Balance: Health and Pathology in New Religious Movements, in SPIRITUAL CHOICES 265, 272-73
(Dick Anthony et al. eds., 1987).
143. See Brown et al., supra note 140, at 216 (in mindfulness, there is an "introduction of a
mental gap between attention and its objects, including self-relevant contents of consciousness. This
de-coupling of consciousness and mental content.., means that self-regulation is more clearly
driven by awareness itself, rather than by self-relevant cognition.").
144. EPSTEIN, The Deconstruction of the Self, in PSYCHOTHERAPY WITHOUT THE SELF, supra
note 106, at 48-52; CLAUDIO NARANJO & ROBERT E. ORNSTEIN, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

MEDITATION 86-87 (1971) (discussing this aspect of mindfulness meditation).
145. "Mindfulness, cultivated through meditation allows a mediator to approach neutrality in
discourse through a strengthened ability to recognize personal bias when it occurs and reduce the
influence of such bias on his speech and actions." Evan M. Rock, Note, Mindfulness Meditation,
The Cultivation of Awareness, Mediator Neutrality, and the Possibility of Justice, 6 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 347, 363 (2005). See also Brach, supra note 106, at 30 (discussing the usefulness
of the mindful negotiator taking the observer's perspective during negotiation).
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In the ideal case, a sense of reverence and respect for one's self and
others is also developed through meditation and similar practices. In other
words, one develops not only the capacity for mindful awareness but also the
ability to reach into the moment of the mediation with a positive sense of
affirmation.
To the extent this happens, parties will more readily experience the
mediator's presence as a source
of support and objectivity. This is a positive
146
aspect of the social brain.
IV.

THE IDR CYCLE: SELF AND IDENTITY IN THE PROCESS OF MEDIATION

From the perspective of self and identity, the most basic and important
psychological dynamic in mediation is the IDR cycle. This is the cycle of
narcissistic inflation, followed by deflation and, ideally, realistic resolution
that occurs in most mediations. Impasse is a critical moment 147 during the
cycle, one which can best be understood if one understands the
psychological underpinnings of the cycle as a whole.
A.

Pre-MediationOverconfidence

It is well established that parties generally enter mediation with
overconfident expectations. This finding has been replicated in hundreds of
research studies. 148 It has been called "[o]ne of the most robust findings in
research on social perceptions and cognition over the last two decades. 14 9 It
is consistent with my experience and that of many mediators, even if one
accounts for posturing.'50

146. See supra Part II.A (discussing the social brain). See also DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE, THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 43 (2006) (discussing the motor

neurons: "This triggering of parallel circuitry in two brains lets us instantly achieve a shared sense of
what counts in a given moment ....Neuroscientists call that mutually reverberating state 'empathic
resonance,' a brain-to-brain linkage ....). For Gallese's view of this phenomenon, see infra note
190.
147. The meaning of this term is discussed supra note 9.
148. Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory andPractice,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 284-98 (2006) (extensive discussion of overconfidence, which

is viewed by the author as the most significant psychological impediment to settlement, and other
self-enhancing biases); see also Birke & Fox, supra note 1, 15-19 (1999) (also discussing positive
illusions such as overconfidence).
149. Korobkin, supra note 148, at 284 (quoting David A. Armour & Shelly E. Taylor, When
Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)).
150. Id. at 291 (taking posturing into consideration).
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Unfortunately, "[n]o problem in judgment and decision making is more
prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence.''.
Overconfidence has been linked to entrepreneurial failure, unsuccessful
corporate mergers and acquisitions, war, excessively high trading in the
stock market, labor strikes and, of course, litigation.1
Overconfident
negotiators set unrealistic reservation points. As a result, they close fewer
deals.153
B.

Why Overconfidence?

The findings regarding overconfidence are by no means self-explanatory
or obvious. Parties to mediation consistently experience a great deal of
anxiety prior to the mediation. These anxieties are amplified by the fact that
the mediation occurs in a group setting. The likelihood of narcissistic
vulnerability increases in a group because a person must perform in front of
observers and must confront other people with their own needs and
priorities. 154 How is it, then, that by the time parties arrive at the mediation
table they are overconfident?
Overconfidence is a type of grandiosity; it may be correlated with
narcissism 55 and "inflated, positive views of the self."' 156 One chooses to
experience an idealized sense of one's negotiating possibilities (and
implicitly one's self) in part as a defense to the sense of vulnerability and
anxiety attendant upon participation in negotiation and mediation.'57 One's

151. Don Moore & Paul J. Healey, The Trouble with Overconfidence, 118 PSYCHOL. REV. 2,
502 (2008) (citing S. PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993).).
152. Id.
153. Birke & Fox, supra note 1, at 15-16. See also Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman,
The Effect of Reframing and NegotiatorOverconfidence on BargainingBehaviors and Outcomes, 28
ACAD. MGMT. J. 34, 38-39,46 (1985).
154. Brown, supra note 10, at 119 (noting there is a greater sensitivity, and thus more potential
for wounded pride and spiteful retaliation, "when bargainers feel they have been made to look
foolish or weak before a salient audience .... "); Jerome S. Gans & Robert L. Weber, The Detection
of Shame in Group Psychotherapy: Uncovering the Hidden Emotion, 50 INT'L. J. GROUP
PSYCHOTHERAPY 381, 392 (2000) (public nature of groups intensify transference reactions of
shame); William K. Hahn, Resolving Shame in Group Psychotherapy, 44 INT'L. J. GROUP
PSYCHOTHERAPY 449, 459 (1994) (same).
155. See W. Keith Campbell et al., Narcissism, Confidence and Risk Attitude, 17 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 297 (2004).
156. Birke & Fox, supranote 1,at 15.
157. See De Dreu & van Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 346 (noting conflicts involve threats,
which causes a drop in positive affect; "to escape this uncomfortable state, people engage in self-
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natural aggression and sense of strength are also important sources of fuel
for this dynamic.' 58
Stated another way, while parties in mediation most often do not regress
in the technical sense of returning to earlier age levels, nevertheless, even
people who are stable under normal conditions may find themselves clinging
to narcissistic defenses, such as hostility, grandiosity, and entitlement.
Human beings activate defensive systems in the face of threat.
C. Offer and Counterofferas NarcissisticInjury

Generally, the first real assault on a party's overconfident hopes and
expectations is the opening offer or the first counteroffer. Depending upon
how great the expectations have been, the disappointment at this time may
be intense. The mediator's responses at this time are crucial. They may
include the following:
Respect. The mediator's demonstration of respect for the parties
addresses two levels of the self. It mirrors and validates each party on the
fundamental level of being, as a human being. Yet it simultaneously
addresses the psychological issue stimulated by interpersonal conflict-the
validity, stability, and value of the party's sense of self. This is why it is
such a powerful practice.
The word "respect" comes from the Latin respicere, "to look back at."' 5 9
Respect is indeed a form of mirroring, which, as we have seen is one of the
most basic ways of recognizing and supporting the integrity of another's
self. 6 ° Respect is, however, an adultform of mirroring.'

Accordingly, it

elicits and fosters adult responses in the recipient.

enhancement"); DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS: HOW TO
OVERCOME OBSTACLES AND ACHIEVE BRILLIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND

BEYOND 135 (2007) (overconfidence caused by need to "keep us feeling good about ourselves").
158. Cf. ALMAAS, THE PEARL, supra note 108, at 211-13 (discussing the natural sense of

strength).
159. Sin Yee Chan, The Confucian Notion ofJing (Respect), 56 PHILO. E. & W. 229, 240
(2006) (quoting from Robin Dillon, Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration, 22 CANADIAN J.
PHILO. 108 (1992)).
160. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 22, 50, 59-60, 69, 93-97 and accompanying text. Cf.
ROBERT A.

BARUCH

TRANSFORMATIVE

BUSH

APPROACH

&

JOSEPH

P.

TO CONFLICT

FOLGER,

73-75

THE

(2005)

PROMISE

OF

(explaining

MEDIATION:

the

importance

THE

of

encouraging recognition between parties in transformative mediation).
161. Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 741, 754, n.38 (2001) (explaining that mutual respect is or should be
exemplified in relationships among adults) (citing JEAN PIAGET, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES 119 (Leslie
Smith ed., 1995)). For more on respect, see supra note 121 and accompanying text, and see infra
note 186 and Part W.F.
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Mediator interventions such as
Looping & Reframing.
"looping,"' 162 or reframing are also useful, primarily because they constitute
a form of mirroring. Through these practices the parties feel a sense of
recognition, sometimes profound and sometimes mutual, 163 which
encourages them to become less defensive.64
Also important in these practices is what is not mirrored back: the
party's underlying ego investment will not be mirrored back in the
mediator's neutral recitation. Mirroring in this context thus encourages the
party to consider his views, and those of others, with less psychological
charge.
Empathy. The mediator's empathy also helps parties reconnect with a
deeper sense of reflective functioning and capacity for insight. This may be
because empathy reminds us, unconsciously or in implicit memory,165 of the
as a result of
early days of childhood when the core sense of 1self
66 developed
others focusing on and understanding our needs.
For parties who are highly narcissistic, or who experience the self as
vulnerable during mediation, empathy may be problematic. For them,
"empathy further highlight[s] some humiliating lack in themselves that they
did not already know. 167 Empathy may then produce a sense of shame-

162. Looping is the term used by Gary J. Friedman and Jack Himmelstein to describe the
process of the mediator's reciting back or neutrally paraphrasing the statements of parties or counsel
in order to demonstrate understanding. Gary J. Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict
Together: The Understanding-BasedModel of Mediation, 2006 J. DIsP. RESOL. 523, 529-537 (2006)
[hereinafter Friedman & Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict] (discussing and demonstrating practice of
looping). See also GARY J. FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT:
MEDIATING THROUGH UNDERSTANDING 68-76 (2008) (discussing theory more extensively). For a
philosopher's view of this practice, see also JACOB NEEDLEMAN, WHY CAN'T WE BE GOOD? 58-81
(2007) (demonstrating and discussing the same practice, although without using the term "looping").
163. On mutual recognition, see supra Part I.B. On profound recognition, see Barbara K.
Eisold, Profound Recognition: Where Does It Fit in Analytic Work?, 35 CONTEMP.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 107 (1999) (describing the importance of profound recognition, the experience of
feeling deeply comprehended and acknowledged).
164.

ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM J. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT

WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-55 (Bruce Patton ed., 1983).
165. SIEGEL, supra note 101, at 29 ("Implicit memory involves parts of the brain that do not
require conscious processing during encoding or retrieval.").
166. See supranotes 59-62 and accompanying text.
167. Cynthia J. Shilkret, Endangered by Interpretations: Treatment by Attitude of the
Narcissistically Vulnerable Patient,23 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 30, 32 (2006). See also Arnold
H. Modell, A Narcissistic Defense Against Affects and the Illusion of Self-Sufficiency, 56 INT'L J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 275 (1975), reprintedin ESSENTIAL PAPERS, supra note 2, at 293, 302 (speaking
in the context of therapy: "Where there is a precociously developed and fragile sense of self
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which will be defended against-rather than a sense of support. Stated
another way, while the inability to feel empathy for others is characteristic of
narcissism, 16 narcissism may also cause some people to reject empathy from
others. 1 69 A response of narcissistic devaluation may be elicited instead.17 °
However, an inner positive attitude may be helpful to these clients, and
acceptable to them.17'

D. Impasse: Crisis of Mutual Recognition

Painful as it may sometimes be, as the negotiation continues the parties
begin to acquire greater resilience and more information about the other
side's interests and positions. They also begin to learn just what in their own
previously overconfident assessments are unrealistic.
Eventually, the parties stretch to a point where an impasse, or at least
what seems like an impasse, occurs. Up to this point, each party has focused
her mind's eye on her desired negotiating outcome. Now the view must
include a fuller sense of the picture, with its possibilities for loss, not just
gain, and for continued litigation.
This is the beginning of a type of object constancy; as each party moves
to a more comprehensive view of the situation and the other party, including
the other's interests and positions. 7 2 Each must also acknowledge the
weaknesses, not only the strengths, of her own position. This is increased
reflective173 functioning and a more intersubjective, reality-based view of the
conflict.

defended by fantasies of omnipotence and self-sufficiency, a[n] ...alliance is not possible.");
Bernard Apfelbaum, Interpretive Neutrality, 53 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 917, 926-931
(2005) (discussing shame reactions to interpretation in narcissistic clients).
168. See supra note 78 for DSM IV criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
169. Id. However, the rejection of empathy may also be merely a strategic maneuver. See
Bilyana Martinovski et al., Rejection of Empathy in Negotiation, 16 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 61,
73 (2007).
170. Devaluation is a frequent response to narcissistic vulnerability. See Otto Kernberg,
Factors in the Psychoanalytic Treatment of NarcissisticPersonalities, 18 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC
ASS'N 51 (1970), reprintedin ESSENTIAL PAPERS, supranote 2, at 218-19, 222, 230 ("They need to
devaluate whatever they receive in order to prevent themselves from experiencing envy."); see
generally Stucke & Sporer, supra note 83.
171. See generally Shilkret, supranote 169. See also KOHUT, supra note 67, at 177 (noting that
in some cases, "only the analyst's willingness to be an attentive silent listener will be tolerable to the
patient").
172. See discussion of object constancy supra Part L.A and text accompanying notes 34-37.
173. As Jessica Benjamin points out, the attempted, but "failed" destruction of the other is an
implicit part of the process of mutual recognition. BENJAMIN, supra note 48. When the other
survives, one is forced to "carry on a relationship with the other who is objectively perceived as
existing outside the self, an entity in her own right." Id. at 39. I see this as analogous to the situation
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At the same time, this is a deeply disappointing time for the parties
because settlement is going to be more difficult than they had hoped. Yet it
is a time of growth. They grow into the possibility of settlement.
The parties' defenses become less dense during this time. For example,
they may consider or even accept a "mediator's proposal" because they are
now convinced that their own previous goals are not reachable.
E. The Mediator'sInner Work DuringImpasse

As the time of impasse arrives, the mediator's own narcissistic issues
may begin to surface. This may take different forms, such as the fear of
failure, or the fear of not "performing." Accordingly, this part of the process
tests the mediator's capacity to release the professional ego ideal, 174 to let go
of the self-image of the great or effective mediator.
In the ideal case, one experiences a deep sense of "letting go," a
reminder that one's true value and identity are not determined by the result
of the mediation. When this release happens, a kind of peacefulness may be
experienced even in the midst of the conflict. The release has made it
possible.
Intersubjective theorist Jessica Benjamin writes of a similar dynamic
during psychoanalytic impasse. The analyst confronts her own shame but
must remember that "breakdown and repair are a part of a larger process." 175
This "surrender means a deep acceptance of the necessity of becoming
involved in ... impasses" because breakdown and repair are inevitable parts
It is a "surrendering rather than [a]
of human relationships. 76
submitting.'' 177 It also "put[s] an end to the buck ' 1passing"
wherein a
"member of [a] dyad tries to put the bad into the other.' 78
Daniel Stem, too, notes that during certain crucial moments in therapy
(and in negotiation/mediation) 7 9 "there is an immediate sense that the

in mediation when the parties have attempted to assert their will and dominance, yet ultimately must
recognize each other's interests to move through impasse.
174. See also supraPart III.B (discussing the professional ego ideal).
175.

Jessica Benjamin, Beyond Doer and Done To: An Intersubjective View of Thirdness,

LXXIII PSYCHOANAL. Q. 5, 29 (2004) [hereinafter Benjamin, Beyond Doer].
176. Id. Benjamin also speaks of the psychoanalytic concept of thirdness, a concept that is not
discussed in this article. Id.
177. Id. at 32.
178. Id. at 33.
179. On Stem's analogy between therapy and negotiation, see Stem, supra note 135, at 367.
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existing intersubjective field is threatened.
,,.80 Something is needed to
resolve the condition of suspense that has been created,18' but the "therapist
feels disarmed and the level of anxiety rises because he or she really does
not know what to do."' 82 ' The situation demands something beyond a
83
"neutral, technical response."

1

What is needed is a "moment of meeting,"

84
a moment of true interpersonal contact, to resolve the crisis.
This "moment of meeting" happens in mediation when the mediator's
sincere belief that the dispute may indeed not settle is conveyed to the
parties. This reinforces for them that now is the time of personal
responsibility; they must indeed decide whether or not to bring the matter to
resolution. During this critical moment, to paraphrase Jessica Benjamin, the
mediator herself is the first to change, and it is her change that ultimately
makes the client's change possible.'8

F. Respect and the Moment of Meeting: CriticalMoments in the Mediation
The mediator's respect and affirmation of the parties may now play a

crucial role in helping them to release their ego investments in the dispute
and to weigh their options more clearly. In the ideal situation, the
mediator's deep respect for the client arises as a natural, attuned response to
the client's dilemma at this time.' 86 This allows one inwardly to support the
client on the level of his or her true value and identity, which is not
contingent on what others think, or the result of the mediation. However,

180. STERN, PRESENT MOMENT supra note 51, at 167.
181. Stem, supra note 135, at 370.
182. Id.
183.

STERN, PRESENT MOMENT, supra note 51, at 168.

184. Id. at 172.
185. Benjamin, Beyond Doer, supra note 178, at 32. The intersubjective view acknowledges
the importance of change in the analyst, not just change in her clients. Id. This may include the
analyst's recognition of his or her own inability to find a solution for the clients, which may,
ironically, help both client and therapist reach a resolution. Id. at 38-41. Assuming similar
principles are applicable in mediation, this complements, but is distinct from, the emphasis in some
approaches on changing the parties or their interactions. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supranote 160,
at 233 (discussing the importance of transforming parties' conflict interactions).
186. The naturalness of the respect demonstrates its authenticity:
[W]hen I am aware of a respect for you, I am much more likely to be piously fatuous or
perhaps self-consciously embarrassed... [n]o, the authenticity of the mutual respect does
not require that I ... focus my attention on my respect for you; it is fully expressed in the
correct 'live' and spontaneous performance of the act.
HERBERT FINGARETrE, CONFUCIUS-THE SECULAR AS SACRED 9 (1972).

Nevertheless, one's

training as a mediator is important precisely because it helps one prepare the ground from which this
respect will naturally arise.
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the mediator must, at the same time, maintain an appropriate, safe and
respectful distance." 7

These "moments of meeting" may be therapeutic moments if, as the
intersubjective theorists have it, "each significant affective context in the life
of an individual can potentially create transformations, not because previous
attitudes (conscious or unconscious) are modified but because new
organizing principles are established."'' 8
Yet the goal is not merely therapeutic. It is equally important to try to
help the client disengage the sense of self-identity from the issues at stake in
the negotiation, and to promote objective thinking.
Ideally, in
psychoanalytic terms, the mediator's attuned mirroring and encouragement
of reflective thinking at this time helps the party to engage his own reflective
function. 8 9 Or in the terms of Almaas and Muquddam, ideally the
mediator's respect facilitates a sufficient release of ego activity to activate a
deeper sense of self and objectivity.' 9"
G. The Role of Evaluation

Although evaluation at the early stages of the mediation may not be
appropriate, hopefully by the time of impasse the party's relationship with
the mediator has arrived at the point where it will be welcome.
Some have argued that mediation and evaluation are inherently
contradictory.' 9' Seen from the perspective of issues of self and identity,

187. Eisold, supra note 163, at 111 ("Space, the maintenance of respectful distance, along with
the clear sense of the making of connection.., are requisite aspects of [profound] recognition.").
188. Gianni Nebbiosi, OrganizingPatterns in a Dyad and in a Group: Theoretical and Clinical
Implications, 23 PSYCHOANALYTIC INQUIRY 750, 756 (2003) (quoting R.D. STOLOROW & G.E.
ATWOOD, CONTEXTS OF BEING: THE INTERSUBJECTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE (1st

ed., 1992)).
189. See supra Part L.C (discussing reflective functioning).
190. Communication with Faisal Muqaddam (Mar. 2007). In neuroscientific terms, if the
empathic resonance is deep enough, the mediator's respect may actually help the party gain access to
his own self-respect through the mirror neurons. See supra note 146 (discussing empathic
resonance). See also Gallese, supra note 95, at 161-62.
191. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996) (discussing differing
approaches to mediation); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and
the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003) (additional analysis of differences in
styles of mediation). See also E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, What's Going On in Mediation,
An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary
Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 80-89 (2004) (summarizing views of evaluation).
211
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however, the mediator's primary task is to encourage parties to engage their

own reflective functioning' 92 and capacity for objectivity, thus minimizing
or neutralizing narcissistic investments in the conflict. To a certain extent,
the airing of alternative views of the conflict, sometimes including the
mediator's own views, is necessary to move the dialogue to a level where
this kind of thinking can take place.
As a preliminary matter, of course, one must make sure the parties
understand the reasons for each other's actions. 193 This is the hallmark of
reflective functioning.' 94 However, a respectful discussion of weaknesses
195
and strengths in the parties' positions and legal logic, when appropriate,
and when done in a safe setting,
may also help depersonalize the conflict and
96
reduce self-enhancing biases.1
Evaluation may be particularly helpful for those with narcissistic
tendencies. Due to their grandiosity, they may have difficulty anticipating
the adverse long-term consequences of their actions.' 97
Certain people, those whom analysts call the "thick-skinned" narcissists,
are also insensitive to feelings.' 98 Confrontation with them may be
recommended.' 99 Discussing goals, rather than feelings, will be most
effective with these clients. °°
Yet it may be a challenging experience. People with strong narcissistic
tendencies often become devaluing or aggressive in response to feedback.20'
192. See supra Part I.C (discussing reflective functioning).
193. Keith G. Allred et al., The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation
Performance, 70 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 175, 185 (1997) (people can avoid
excessively high anger by seeking to discover factors that may have influenced another's behavior);
Pillutla & Mumighan, supra note 10, at 209 ("[A]nger and resentment are strongest when poor
outcomes are inadequately explained.").
194. See supra Part I.C (discussing reflective functioning).
195. One may withhold one's opinions for many reasons; I do not believe there is a duty to
evaluate. On discussing the law within the context of understanding-based mediation, see Friedman
& Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict, supra note 162, at 548-49.
196. Korobkin, supra note 148, at 284-98 (discussing usefulness of various evaluative
techniques to de-bias parties); Adler, supra note 13, at 172 ("[A]voiding hasty judgments about our
opponents' intentions requires realistic, clear thinking."); De Dreu & van Knippenberg, supra note
11, at 355 ("[Wlhen individuals are motivated to process information thoroughly, their selfenhancement tendencies are reduced .... ").
197. Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, The Inevitable Cons, 2
HARV. Bus. REV. 69-77 (2000) (narcissists can court danger due to overconfidence); Campbell,
supra note 153 (discussing grandiosity and overconfidence and authors' studies examining
correlation between narcissism and risk taking).
198. Shilkret, supra note 167, at 32.
199. Id.
200. 1 am indebted to the late Laura Farrow for the point that with some people, goal-oriented
discussions are more effective than any other kind of discussion.
20 1. See supra notes 84, 170-172 and accompanying text.
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How one responds, internally and externally, will be a function in part of the
extent to which one has worked through one's own narcissistic issues, and
can stand one's ground and stay in one's role.
H. Release ofIdentity in the Processof Resolution
Something akin to a renegotiation or release of identity may occur for
one or more of the parties during the process of working through impasse.
Faced with the impossible, painful, practical dilemmas inherent in the
conflict, they come to see that their situation is exacerbated by the linkage in
their minds between the outcome of the mediation and their own identities.
Under the pressure of the conflict,
they manage to question and perhaps even
202
to cut the link between the two.
This release of identity is a critical moment, indeed perhaps the critical
moment, in the mediation.0 3 When it occurs, there will be clearer thinking
and reflective functioning. 0 4
This process may sound complicated, but it can be quite simple. A party
may simply decide not to suffer or struggle any longer about the last
remaining item on the table during the negotiation. Inwardly-and without
necessarily saying so-there has been a letting go.
One should not, however, underestimate this achievement. For some, it
represents the release of an aspect of the identity, akin to what would be
called nonattachment, °5 disidentification,20 6 or "letting go ''2°7 in the
language of spiritual or psychological 20 8 practice. For others, it will be a less
profound and less exacting experience.
202. I believe this point corresponds to what Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein call
reaching the core of the conflict. Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Getting to the Heart of the
Matter, Center for Mediation in Law (May 2004).
203. See supranotes 9 and 135-136 (discussing the concept of critical moments in negotiation).
204. See supraPart I.C (discussing reflective functioning).
205. Elizabeth J. Harris, Detachment and Compassion in Early Buddhism, BUDDHIST
PUBLICATION SOC'Y (1997), http://www.bps.lk/bodhi-leaveslibrary/bodhi leaves_pdf/bl_141.pdf.
206. ALMAAS, THE PEARL, supra note 108, at 60. ("The work on inner realization, however,
requires that one bring to consciousness all the ego identifications which are used for identity, and

that one then gradually (or sometimes abruptly) disidentify from this mental content"); Epstein,
supra note 103, at 48.
207. Brach, supra note 106, at 35-36,43 n. Il(citing JACK KORNFIELD, A PATH WITH HEART, A
GUIDE THROUGH THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF SPIRITUAL LIFE 112 (1993)) (discussing "letting

go').
208.

Cf Jeffrey R. Martin, Mindfulness: A Proposed Common Factor, 7 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY

INTEGRATION 291, 292, 296-310 (1997) (arguing terms such as "deautomatization," "detachment,"
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L

Resolution

The release of identity is often the signal event that heralds resolution.
The party decides to move from a position that has previously seemed
immovable, and the case resolves.
In other cases, resolution arrives in a different form. Someone comes up
with a new idea to bridge the gap. The mediator dares to raise a possibility
that previously would have been dismissed, but now is seen as workable.
From the space created by the release of expectations and identity, the
resolution has had room to emerge.
J

After Resolution - Toward Object Constancy

Assuming the parties do indeed settle their dispute, they will often be
somewhat disappointed because they have not achieved their previously
desired goals. The ability to consummate the settlement will in part depend
upon whether they can maturely accept the corresponding deflation without
taking it to be a reflection on who they are.
Their ability to accept a compromise will also depend in part upon
whether they can relinquish the urge to demonize the other party, to split the
conflict solely into a battle between the "good me" and the "evil other."
These are components of mature "object constancy.' 20 9
Strangely enough, in multi-party litigation, this is frequently more
difficult, or less attractive, for those with relatively less at stake in the
litigation, that is, for the more minor players. Since they have known all
along that they are in a less vulnerable position than others in the mediation,
it will often be harder for them to accept the closure of their negotiating
opportunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Issues of self and identity are implicated in all aspects of the resolution
Thinking from different disciplines can help us
of human conflict.
understand the way they impact mediation. Yet ultimately, the nature of the
self and its identity will always remain a fundamental mystery, the mystery
of who we are.

"decentering," and "nonattachment," used by some authors in the literature on psychotherapy, also
refer to a type of psychological freedom found in mindfulness).
209. See supra Part L.A (discussing object constancy as the ability to incorporate both positive
and negative aspects in the object and resolve splitting). See also supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text

214

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol10/iss2/1

32

